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ABSTRACT
This article is based on a qualitative empirical project about a distinct kin-
ship group who were among the first identified internationally as having a
genetic susceptibility to cancer (Lynch Syndrome). 50 were invited to par-
ticipate (42 were tested; eight declined genetic testing). 15, who had all
accepted testing, were interviewed. They form a unique case study. This
study aimed to explore interviewees’ experiences of genetic testing and
how these influenced their family relationships. A key finding was that
participants framed the decision to be tested as ‘common sense’; the
idea of choice around the decision was negated and replaced by a moral
imperative to be tested. Those who did not follow ‘common sense’ were
judged to be imprudent. Family members who declined testing were dis-
cussed negatively by participants. The article addresses what is ethically
problematic about how test decliners were discussed and whether these
ethical concerns extend to others who are offered genetic testing. Discus-
sions showed that genetic testing was viewed as both an autonomous
choice and a responsibility. Yet the apparent conflict between the right to
autonomy and the moral imperative of responsibility allowed participants
to defend test decliners’ decisions by expressing a preference for or
defending choice over responsibility. The ‘right not to know’ seemed an
important moral construct to help ethically manage unpopular decisions
made by close family who declined testing. In light of this research, the
erosion of the ‘right not to know’ in the genomic age could have subtle
yet profound consequences for family relationships.
INTRODUCTION
This article explores what can be learned about the ethi-
cal thinking of families undergoing genetic testing for a
cancer susceptibility syndrome. It is based on empirical
data from a qualitative research study1 with a particular
kinship group, defined genetically as a family.2
Originally, the study aimed to explore, from sociologi-
cal and anthropological perspectives, the meanings of
family that participants experienced in the context of
their history of genetic investigations. Participants were
among the first internationally to have been identified
with Lynch Syndrome (LS),3 a genetic susceptibility to
Address for correspondence: Lorraine Cowley, Newcastle University – PEALS, 4th Floor Claremont Bridge, Newcastle NE1 4HP, UK. Email:
Lorraine.Cowley@ncl.ac.uk
1 L. Cowley, 2012. Genetics and Kinship: Finding Morality at their
Intersection. In Geography Politics and Sociology. British Library Ethos:
Newcastle University: 275.
2 Participants did not always self-identify with each other as family.
Some only became aware they were biologically related through medical
investigation of their cancer history. To the medical profession they were
defined as a family.
3 Lynch Syndrome (LS) is a dominantly inherited cancer predisposition
syndrome thought to account for approximately 5% of all colorectal
cancer. Those with LS have up to an 80% lifetime risk of bowel cancer
and cancers of the digestive or urinary tract. Additionally, women have
an increased risk of gynaecological cancers. H. Lynch, et al. Hereditary
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cancer. They have therefore lived with the implications of
this knowledge longer than anyone else, and their experi-
ences form a unique and important case study. A key
finding of this research was that participants discussed
family members who had declined genetic testing in neg-
ative ways, suggesting they felt there was a moral impera-
tive to accept a test. The article addresses what is
ethically problematic about the way that test decliners
were discussed, and whether these ethical concerns may
extend to others who are offered genetic testing. Sharing
analyses of participants narratives will provide nuanced
insights for ethical guidelines that address what is
broadly referred to as the psychosocial consequences of
genetic testing. Social sciences have an important role in
shaping ethical thinking and the article will make a dis-
tinct contribution to this burgeoning body of knowledge.
The article first gives an overview of the study, includ-
ing the methods used and a brief summary of key find-
ings. This section also addresses what is distinctive about
the study family and how they define family in this con-
text. The literature on genetic test decliners will be dis-
cussed in the section that follows, before analyses of the
studys data are given. The analyses draw on several con-
cepts by focusing on how participants discussed family
members who declined a genetic test. I shall outline
where these data sit within the ethical landscape, and use
them to pose questions for current genetic counselling
practices. I will conclude with some reflections on the
implications of these data for genetic counsellors in their
ethical deliberations in the context of genomic medicine.
ABOUT THE STUDY
The study, conducted in the North of England between
2007 and 2012, focused on a family known to a Regional
Genetics Service. The term family at this stage refers to
a genetically defined kinship group as defined by the
pedigree that was constructed over decades of genetic
research into their history of early onset cancer. This
family contributed to research that characterized one of
the genes causing LS (hMLh1),4 making testing for LS
possible and also making them the first to know their
genetic risk of LS. They are distinctive when compared
to others who undergo genetic testing in contemporary
genetic counselling practice.5 Their engagement with
genetic investigation began in the 1960s when a village
GP noticed that multiple family members developed
bowel cancer at an unusually young age. He began a
genealogical project with some of the family that was
continued by genetic services in the 1980s. The genealogy
project linked others with cancer to the family.6 Some of
those who were previously unaware of their biological
links became known to each other through this project.
Against this background family members had been
offered genetic testing, but not all had accepted. In the
study reported here, 50 of those family members were
still contactable, and were invited to participate. Of the
50, eight known family members who had declined to be
tested also declined to participate in this study. Eight
women and seven men, all of whom had accepted a
genetic test, agreed to take part; four of the men had the
known LS mutation, whilst all others had tested nega-
tive. In a series of narrative interviews participants were
invited to discuss their experiences of genetic testing and
their understandings of family. The interviews were semi-
structured, but interviewees own associative trails were
followed, allowing them to choose what to tell me. I used
photo and graphic elicitation techniques to stimulate
responses, for example asking them to talk about family
photographs, showing them their genetic family tree, and
asking them to construct social maps. Social maps
depicted concentric circles within which participants
showed who they considered to be closest family (i.e.
those placed in the central circle). These narrative meth-
ods produced selective accounts, and in their selection of
what to tell and with what emphasis, participants created
moral identities.7
Although the visual methodologies elicited rich narra-
tives about participants social practices and meanings of
family, space does not allow further elaboration of these
findings here. The focus in this article is on how family
members who had declined genetic testing were discussed
by participants who had accepted it.
TEST DECLINERS - WHAT WE KNOW
FROM THE LITERATURE
There are few studies that focus on those who have
declined any genetic test, and this lack is particularly
Colorectal Cancer: An Updated Review. Part II: The Lynch Syndrome
(Hereditary Nonpolyposis Colorectal Cancer). Gastroenterol Hepatol
2005; 1: 117–133.
4 R. Kolodner et al. Structure of the HumanMLH1 Locus and Analysis
of a Large Hereditary Non Polyposis Colorectal CarcinomaKindred for
MLH1Mutations.Cancer Research 1995; 55: 242–248.
5 Those undertaking genetic testing for LS in current practice would
usually see a geneticist or counsellor three times over three to six months.
This varies depending on local policies and practices about predictive
genetic testing.
6 G. Dunstone & T. Knaggs. Familial Cancer of the Colon and Rectum.
J Med Genet 1972; 9: 451–456. The family concerned has been discussed
in the medical literature. Some family members have contributed to tele-
vision documentaries. Care has been taken to ensure anonymity and de-
identification of individuals by using pseudonyms and de-gendering
relationships within quotes. Genetics colleagues who have proof-read
quoteswere unable to identify participants they would usually know.
7 J. Singer. Narrative Identity and Meaning Making Across the Adult
Lifespan: An Introduction. J Pers 2004; 72: 437–459; Cowley, op. cit.
note 1. For further consideration of narrative methodologies and moral
identities.
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noticeable for cancer genetic testing. An Australian study
looked at participants who had declined a test for LS
and found that the unanimously reported reason for
declining was a potential problem in obtaining medical
insurance. While in Australia having a mutation in LS
might impede access to health care,8 the same is not the
case in the UK because of the National Health Service.
Interestingly, the focus of critical discourse in the Austra-
lian study was insurance companies9 because their poli-
cies were perceived as preventing individuals from being
able to accept a genetic test. An assumption made in
that paper is that without insurance barriers, genetic test-
ing for LS would and should be uncritically accepted.
Two ethnographic case studies discussed how genetic
test decliners were negatively judged by other members
of their families.10 In both studies researchers focused on
an individual who had declined genetic testing, one for
Huntingtons disease11 and the other for Limb Girdle
Muscular Dystrophy,12 and found that both individuals
were deemed by their families to be avoiding moral
responsibility. The studies gave space to test decliners
who were previously considered voiceless13 to express
their views on living with genetic knowledge. They found
that instead of avoiding moral responsibility, test
decliners decisions about testing were made within a dif-
ferent moral framework and based on alternative ration-
alities and logic from family members who accepted
testing.
Decliners were judged for not engaging with genetic
knowledge. However, in fact they had spent time with
affected relatives, researched information on the internet
or found out about the possibility of genetic testing, so
had in fact engaged with genetic knowledge but in a less
public way.14 Declining a genetic test allowed individuals
in both studies to focus their lives on concerns that were
generally felt to be legitimate, like caring for their fami-
lies without the burden of knowledge of an impending
debilitating disease. Therefore, their decisions to decline
might equally be framed as moral ones. However, in
both studies these alternative moral stances were not
deemed acceptable by other family members. Test
decliners were asked by their families to justify and
explain their decisions,15 suggesting that there is a domi-
nant moral paradigm within which declining a genetic
test does not fit. The authors of this paper make the
point that:
Accepting genetics means sliding into a public space
where certain moral questions have to be discussed,
even if each individual is basically free to make his
or her own choice. Genetics, simply because it is
public, imposes the category of moral action – the
one which implies actors endowed with a capacity
for deliberation and decision-making, who assume
full responsibility for their acts.16
These cases demonstrate how looking after ones fam-
ily is morally framed in a genetic context. Both those
who accept and those who decline a genetic test could be
framed as acting morally, although in the cases illus-
trated those who declined were not. This suggests that
what is being contested here is not whether one looks
after ones family but how. In these case studies, genetic
testing is being used as shorthand for doing that. The
next section considers how my data contribute to these
debates by focusing on the way in which interviewees dis-
cussed those who declined genetic testing for LS.
HOW LS INTERVIEWEES FRAMED THE
NOTION OF MORAL IMPERATIVES
It was only when considering interviewees narratives
about choice in genetic testing that moral imperatives17
about testing became apparent. My interest in morality
here is not focused on philosophical understandings of
what makes someone or something moral, but rather it
draws on sociological and cultural understandings of
how moral tales are important to peoples sense of iden-
tity. In considering participants decision-making in their
relational networks I was interested in their ordinary
ethical approach,18 that is, what issues in genetic testing
they found important and how they expressed and devel-
oped their opinions and arguments.
Some participants narratives showed a felt absence of
choice despite their own belief in choice overall. In con-
sidering genetic testing through a lens of choice, I was
struck by the emphasis on the familys role in partic-
ipants constructions of notions of morality. Even when
choice was discussed by participants as being important
enough to be a fundamental right, my analyses showed
8 L. Keogh et al. Is Uptake of Genetic Testing for Colorectal Cancer
Influenced by Knowledge of Insurance Implications? MJA 2009; 191:
255–258.
9 Ibid.
10 L. Huniche. Moral Landscapes and Everyday Life in Families with
Huntingtons Disease: Aligning Ethnographic Description and Bio-
ethics. Soc Sci Med 2011; 72: 1810–1816, M. Callon & V. Rabeharisoa.
GinosLlesson on Humanity: Genetics, Mutual Entanglements and the
Sociologists Role. Econ Soc 2004; 33: 1–27.
11 Huniche, op. cit. note 11.
12 Callon &Rabeharisoa, op. cit. note 11.
13 Huniche, op.cit. note 11, p.1812.
14 Ibid: 1812.
15 Callon &Rabeharisoa, op. cit. note 11, p.8.
16 Ibid: 19.
17 Moral imperative denotes how participants strongly emphasized the
decision to have a genetic test. Some were passionate about it and all
wanted to emphasize the importance (in their view) of accepting a
genetic test. Alternative terms such as moral reason do not capture the
passion with which they expressed their views.
18 S. Banks, JL. Scully, T. Shakespeare. Ordinary Ethics: Lay Peoples
Deliberations on Social Sex Selection.NewGenet Soc 2010: 136
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that the idea of choice in genetic testing within families
was, paradoxically, negated by referring to moral impera-
tives to have a test. These moral imperatives were
expressed in a hierarchical framework. First, all partici-
pants discussed a responsibility to be tested on behalf of
their children. Second, they all discussed a responsibility
for self-care, articulated through lay health beliefs. Lastly,
eight participants discussed a sense of duty to advance
medical research. Collectively, the overarching theme of
the interviews was the importance of morally looking
after ones family, however family was defined.
Some participants did not engage with forming an
argument about the choice to have a genetic test since it
appeared to them to be beyond choice and something
that was incomprehensible to decline, a no brainer. One
participant, for example, said it was the obvious thing to
do. Similarly, another did not see choosing to decline a
test as a possibility, since those who chose not to be tested
were choosing to live in ignorance and this was consid-
ered unacceptable by him/her.19 In short, their views
would seem, on first analysis, to question whether declin-
ing a genetic test is a moral or ethical position. These
views are unpacked further in the following section.
Test decliners were defined by all participants as
ostriches, characterized by the phrase those that bury
their heads in the sand. They were framed as morally
weak at best and neglectful at worst, and were perceived
as lacking courage (Theyll not confront anything); test
decliners were frightened of going to have a genetic test.
The language used to describe those who would not or
could not engage with genetic knowledge was telling.
Regardless of their own test results, participants described
test decliners either explicitly or implicitly as silly,
stupid, selfish, lacking in character, fearing the truth,
illogical and cowardly. All of these characteristics are
uncomplimentary at best and morally damning at worst.
Given that the quality of peoples lives depends greatly
on the quality of their social relations, then to paraphrase
Sayer, this must be a thing that matters to people and is
therefore worthy of social sciences ethical attention.20
Participants judgement of test decliners was narrated
differently depending on the relationship between them.
I focus here on examples that illustrate how moral judge-
ment was discursively managed by family members who
were troubled by a test decliners decision. Family
members still constructed their family as close whilst
managing what was framed as a morally suspect behav-
iour – declining a test – depending on how close they felt
their social relationship to be. This illustrates the efforts
participants made to maintain the quality of their rela-
tionships despite behaviour of which they disapproved,
strongly signalling that maintaining closeness mattered
despite the negative moral judgment.
Diane, a participant who did not have the mutation,
believed that genetic testing was an individual choice but
was nevertheless troubled that her parent and aunt had
exercised that individual choice to decline testing. This
was problematic for Diane and her siblings because they
all wanted to know their genetic status and therefore
agreed to be tested. Of her parents decision to decline
she said:
Diane: Well, it was their [parent and aunts] belief I
suppose and their opinions and all that, but I mean,
it didnt really help you.
Me: So how did that make you feel about your [par-
ent] and your Auntie?
Diane: I think [sigh] I think initially we were all,
probably all [number] of us [Diane and her siblings]
were a little bit annoyed. But then I think they were
annoyed with us for going to get tested.21
Whilst it may have been an individual choice, this
account gives a sense of the tensions that existed between
those who chose to be tested and those who chose
against. Accepting that choice is rarely completely auton-
omous but is contingent upon many factors, it is interest-
ing that the individuality of choice was still upheld here,
even though contingencies of choice such as a sense of
family obligation or sensitivities to others needs may
have been present but were not perceived as having been
acted upon. Diane indicated that family dynamics were
disturbed when individuals exercised their choice to be
tested or not. For Diane, her parents decision to decline
was framed as being unhelpful to her because she then
had to go through the testing process (and was shown
not to have the mutation). She felt that her parents
choice should have been morally contingent upon the
sense of family obligation in which, in having a test, her
parent would be putting the needs of his/her children
above his/her own. Whilst from Dianes perspective her
parent failed to fulfil this obligation, she later framed her
parents decision as having consequences not only for
her, but also, since her parent was deceased, for medical
and family research (now well never know).
Another interviewee, Fran, who did not have the
mutation, discussed how her parent did not want to
engage with genetic testing because s/he couldnt cope
with it. Despite this s/he still went ahead with the test
but did not want to be told the result. It is interesting
that Frans parent still had the test but managed the
19 Dunstone &Knaggs, op. cit. note 6.
20 A. Sayers. 2011.Why Things Matter to People. Social Science, Values
and Ethical Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 7
21 This suggests that test decliners used a different moral framework
and made negative judgments about those who were tested. Although
interesting there are no further data with which to explore this
suggestion.
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situation by requesting that his/her results should not be
told to him/her. I shall return to this in a later section.
Fran compared herself to her parent:
Fran: I would prefer to know. . . I suppose [its] just
the way youre born isnt it? Just because I think if
you know things you can prepare for them or, do
what you want, you know. Where my [parent] would
rather not and just carry on.
Fran excused her parent for not wanting to know
because it was just the way s/he was born, thereby avoid-
ing the negative associations with others who did not
want to know.
Contrast this action with another participants
account of a parent declining a test. Frank illustrated
how declining a test was beyond his parents control
because of upbringing:
Frank: So I think [s/he] was brought up with that
sort of generation and that mentality you know?
And it was sort of like, I dont know, it was almost
sort of fate, what will be, will be type of thing. So I
can understand from that point of view. I mean we
call, or I call that sort of burying your head in the
sand but. . . its the way. . . probably the way [s/hed]
been brought up and what [s/he] had seen you know?
It was [his/her] way of dealing with it I guess. So I
could understand [his/her] point of view.
This quote illustrates an intergenerational difference in
approaches to genetic knowledge. In other parts of the
interview Franks parent is discussed as having witnessed
the painful death of his/her own parent and the offer of
genetic testing was a reminder of this experience: It
brought up all the old things [s/he] had. Like [his/her]
own [parent] died with it.
There are multiple accounts of this scenario in the
data, older generations having witnessed more cancer
deaths with little palliation of symptoms. Thus, previous
generations were framed as powerless and therefore non-
culpable in their fate whereas, paradoxically, the present
generation does have a choice but by making the wrong
choice, i.e. declining intervention whether it is a genetic
test or screening interventions such as colonoscopy,
become culpable in their fate. By virtue of their experi-
ence and the participants more positive disposition
towards this relative, test decliners who were discussed in
this way were absolved from moral accountability and
became objects of pity and frustration; pity because their
trauma was acknowledged and frustration at their lack of
action to change their fate. This has resonance with the
concepts of brute luck and option luck as discussed in
Denier and Hammonds work.22 In the context of
reproductive technologies, these authors discussed what
they call fundamental distinctions between what we are
responsible for doing, or deciding, and what is given to
us. They considered the distinctions between chance, iden-
tified as brute luck (something that we are born with and
have no control over), and choice, identified as option
luck (where a test or intervention exists that can change
or control what we are born with). Ways in which individ-
uals self-identify as lucky or victims of fate may recur-
sively influence how they relate to the notion of choice.
From my data, test decliners were constructed in a nega-
tive light because a genetic test was available. If freedom
of choice to decline a genetic test is considered as a right
it was paradoxically only portrayed as morally valid when
knowledge was unavailable.
While the above accounts rely heavily on the perceived
obligation of parents to engage with genetic testing, it is
interesting that from the point of view of clinical prac-
tice, the concept that there is an imperative to be tested
for the benefit of the children is false, since parents could
decline a test without obstructing their childrens ability
to obtain that information for themselves. Additionally,
whether a parent knows their genetic status or not does
not affect whether their children have inherited the same
mutation. If choice in genetic testing is just about logic,
Diane should not have been troubled by her parents
choice to decline. If Dianes parent did not have the LS
mutation, then her own test was unnecessary but never-
theless Diane was still able to have a test. Participants
framed choice as an important personal and individual
right. Within a liberal rights framework,23 a right to
choose, as it ostensibly operates in the domain of genetic
testing,24 means that Dianes parents decision to decline
testing should not be considered problematic. Thus
although choice seemed important and all participants
defended individuals right to choose, those choices were
only morally valid if the contingencies of familial obliga-
tion had been observed. Frans parent who was tested
against her own preferences for herself but not against
her will for the benefit of her family, is one example.
This leads to questions about the adequacy of the term
free from coercion within the code of ethics for genetic
counselling.25 In counselling someone like Frans mother,
the genetic counsellor might be aware of tacit coercion
from the family. In negotiating the withholding of results
22 Y. Denier. From Brute Luck to Option Luck? On Genetics, Justice,
and Moral Responsibility in Reproduction. J Med Philos 2010; 35: 101–
129, J. Hammond. Genetic Engineering to Avoid Genetic Neglect: From
Chance to Responsibility.Bioethics 2010 24: 160–169.
23 T. Beauchamp & J. Childress. 2001. Principles of Biomedical Ethics.
NewYork: Oxford University Press.
24 J. Haydon. Genetics: Uphold the Rights of all Clients to Informed
Decision-making and Voluntary Action.Nurs Stand 2005; 20: 48–51.
25 AGNC. 2011. Code of Ethics for Genetic Counsellors. AGNCWebsite:
Association of Genetic Nurses and Counsellors (AGNC). Available at:
http://www.agnc.org.uk/about-us/code-of-ethics [Accessed 12 Nov
2015].
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from a hesitant volunteer, the genetic counsellor may be
complicit in that coercion.
In participants accounts genetic testing was the
appropriate moral action to take. Looking at the family
history and their accounts of how it was before genetic
testing, they were all dying (Alan), or the family were
going and saying, well, we think weve got cancer you
know and doctors were saying to them all, no you
know. You cant have (Fran). Key medical figures, like
their GP who began collating their history, were per-
ceived as going beyond the call of duty to find a cause of
their relatives untimely deaths from cancer. This gener-
ated something akin to a sense of obligation to be tested
as reciprocation for the time, effort and commitment that
had been invested in this family by those key medical
figures.
In referring to the rights of autonomy or self-
authorship, participants maintained their moral identities
by signalling an apparent acceptance of difference in
others but simultaneously negatively judging the actions
of those who failed to act in the expected way towards
themselves, children, or research. Relatives who declined
were seen as neglectful in their actions since they chose
not to be tested. For interviewees, the only way to con-
struct a moral self-identity in the context of a genetic test
was to be tested; declining a test, on the grounds of
avoiding a burden of knowledge, was unacceptable and
immoral because it was callous and selfish. Yet posi-
tioning the choice not to know as a moral right still had
value for interviewees in managing their approach to
family members who declined. The right not to know
allowed interviewees, who negatively judged family for
declining testing, to claim a moral position in doing so.
DISCUSSION
The study emerged out of an interest in the effect of par-
ticipants involvement in medical research and knowl-
edge production on their senses of individual and
kinship identity. The families studied provide a particular
context that may well have some bearing on the partic-
ipants views of genetic testing.
The data show that family relationships were put
under pressure when some family members declined to
accept genetic testing. Interestingly, only two of the eight
who declined testing responded to the initial invitation
letter and none participated in the study. Thus those who
declined to be tested had no representative voice to give
a counter-narrative in the data. Genetic test decliners
minority voices remained unrepresented in the study. If
test decliners did not contribute to the study because
they felt negatively judged, then this poses challenges for
ethical thinking about those who decline in contempo-
rary approaches to genomic medicine.
Test decliners may be marginalized by the power
dynamics and cultural norms of a health system where
those offered genetic testing for an adult onset disorder
ostensibly should be able to choose freely either to know
this information or not. However, although premised on
the principle of autonomy, the right not to know in
genetic testing has been hotly debated26 and some have
concluded that the right not to know does not trump
the right to know, when the right to know is framed as
a morally relevant consideration.27 These debates have
been contextualized and historically located in a field of
emerging technological advances; to an extent, technol-
ogy is eroding the right not to know. For example, in
cancer genetics the ability to identify a genetic mutation
has often been dependent upon a relative affected by a
condition giving a DNA sample to test for an underlying
genetic cause.28 Those being asked to give a DNA sam-
ple to try to identify a familial mutation have been
described as holding the trump card.29 The idea of
holding a trump card introduces a different power
dynamic to family relationships. If the trump card holder
does not want to know their genetic status, they may
decline to give their DNA. Some consider that in claim-
ing a right not to know, test decliners are potentially
harming those who do want to know.30 The test
decliners position has been problematized and criticised
as being unethical on the grounds of a right to autonomy
for all.31 It has been suggested32 that in such cases, the
rights of those seeking genetic information are compro-
mised because information is being withheld such that
they cannot act autonomously: since genetic information
is a prerequisite for future autonomous decision-making,
by choosing not to be tested test decliners undermine
others capacity for making autonomous decisions. To
defend a choice that compromises autonomy on the
26 T. Takala. The Right to Genetic Ignorance Confirmed. Bioethics
1999; 13: 288–293, T. Takala & M. Hayry. Genetic Ignorance, Moral
Obligations and Social Duties. J Med Philosy 2000; 25: 107–113, J.
Raikka. Freedom and a Right (Not) to Know. Bioethics 1998; 12: 49–63;
J. Solbakk, S. Holm, B. Hofmann, eds. 2009. The Ethics of Research Bio-
banking. Dordrecht: Springer.
27 H. Widdows. Conceptualising the Self in the Genetic Era. Health
Care Analysis 2007; 15: 5–12, J. Harris &K. Keywood. Ignorance, Infor-
mation and Autonomy. Theor Med Bioeth 2001; 22: 415–436. L. Borto-
lotti. The Relative Importance of Undesirable Truths.Med Health Care
Philos 2013; 16: 683–690.
28 In the study family those samples were requested from all family
members and led to the discovery of Lynch Syndrome.
29 K. Finkler, et al. The NewGenetics and its Consequences for Family,
Kinship, Medicine and Medical Genetics. Soc Sci Med 2003; 57: 403–
412.410.
30 Widdows, Harris &Keywood, Bortolotti, op. cit. note 27.
31 L. Bortolotti, P. Malpas. The Right to Remain in Ignorance about
Genetic Information - Can Such a Right be Defended in the Name of
Autonomy?NZMed J 2005; 118: U1611–U1611.
32 Bortolotti, op. cit. note 27; J. Harris &K. Keywood. Ignorance, Infor-
mation andAutonomy. TheorMed Bioeth 2001; 22: 415–436.
The right not to know 633
VC 2016 The Authors. Bioethics Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
grounds of autonomy is referred to as the incoherence
objection and is therefore also considered problematic.
However, if autonomy is reframed as self-authorship, in
which choices are compatible with an individuals views
and beliefs, then the incoherence objection can be
refuted.33 A test decliner can coherently have self-
authorship regardless of perceived limitations on future
decision-making by themselves or others.
Since the application of whole genome and whole
exome sequencing (WGS; WES) the need to test samples
(including from those who would rather not know) is less
pressing but not redundant. WGS and WES produce
copious data, making interpretation problematic. Com-
parative genome sequences from those affected by the
conditions being interrogated are still needed to validate
reported results. Therefore, those trump card holders
who choose not to know may continue to be viewed by
critics of the right not to know as having a contestable
position. In my study, test decliners did not genuinely
hold trump cards since their relatives could still be
tested, but declining remained contestable to participants
on the grounds that being tested was a familial duty. If
this view is widely held in a society where genomics pro-
vides more opportunities for genetic testing, then the
right to decline is potentially either untenable, or trou-
bling for family relationships.
Genomics knowledge increases the potential to con-
front those who would rather not know their genetic
risk. Genomic technologies produce unlooked for find-
ings, such as cancer susceptibility genes that have action-
able clinical relevance to those who were tested and their
families. Whether the person who sought a test, or their
families, are prepared and want to know these findings is
questionable. Negotiating the limits of what can be
known and what an individual wants to know is a precar-
ious ethical situation both for genetics professionals and
for those undertaking genetic testing. Non-disclosure
could be problematic for genetics professionals, when
working within medical ethical boundaries based on the
principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence
and justice. Erez makes the point that respect for
autonomy is ethically important but not absolute and
must be balanced against non-maleficence and professio-
nal integrity.34
Whilst it may be considered reasonable, and perhaps
to some imperative, to give a patient genetic information
that they did not want if it saved them from harm, what
constitutes harm in this situation would be defined by
the medical professional. Cancer susceptibility genes pre-
dict probabilities of developing disease, not certainties.
As we have seen from my study, for some the potential
psychological burden35 of this information is a poor
trade-off for the return of an arguably limited ability to
prevent and treat early onset disease by means that are
available whether or not a genetic test has been used.
The test decliner in the age of genomic medicine is there-
fore in a precarious situation, since in not engaging with
genetics services, where their desire not to know may be
negotiated, they are at least once removed from the inter-
face of this ethical dilemma. Faced with the full power of
advances in genomic medicine, it may be difficult and in
some cases impossible to stand against such a force. This
may result in the marginalization of test decliners, and if
the goal of medicine is to enhance rather than diminish
lives, then this is problematic.
CONCLUSION
Individuals within families, however they are defined,
will express different needs in relation to knowing about
inherited genetic mutations. Genetic counselling is predi-
cated on the principle of individual autonomy. This
poses inherent tensions in how genetic knowledge comes
to be known and shared within what are called families.
This article set out to address what is ethically problem-
atic about how test decliners were discussed in a distinct
family with a genetic susceptibility to cancer. Although I
was not part of their pre-genetic history, the way that
participants presented their stories may have been influ-
enced by my status as a genetic counsellor turned
researcher. Since narrative methods can prioritize moral
identity values,36 participants might not have framed a
moral agenda around declining a genetic test if different
methods had been deployed. This article proposed that,
within this distinctive study family, it meant more to
decline a test because of their pioneering position in the
history of LS. If their pioneering identity was the most
influential factor in the unquestioning conviction that to
have a genetic test was morally the right thing to do then
the perceived marginalization of test decliners is unlikely
to be common because this pioneering position will not
be replicated. Furthermore, the data uncovered a series
of (mis)understandings about genetic testing that, if con-
sidered using the same logic with which they were
expressed, might weaken the moral imperative to be
tested. Whether explication of these (mis)understandings
might influence how participants viewed having a genetic
33 Bortolotti, op. cit. note 27, p.689.
34 A. Erez, et al. The Right to Ignore Genetic Status of Late Onset
Genetic Disease in the Genomic Era; Prenatal Testing for Huntington
Disease as a Paradigm.Am JMed Genet 2010; Part A: 1774–1780.
35 C. Dancyger, et al. Comparing Family Members Motivations and
Attitudes Towards Genetic Testing for Hereditary Breast and Ovarian
Cancer: AQualitative Analysis. Eur. J. Hum. Genet 2010; 18: 1289–1295;
D. Sacchini, et al. 2002. Genetic Screening - Benefits and Pitfalls. Brati-
slava: Charis: 131–151.
36 Plummer K. 2001. The Call of Life Stories in Ethnographic Research.
In Handbook of Ethnography. P. Atkinson, Coffey, A., Delamont, S.,
Lofland, J. and Lofland, L, eds. London: Sage: 395–406. Singer
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test, or more pertinently whether it would change their
view of those who declined testing and potentially avoid
family disharmony, remains moot.
Other studies had highlighted how genetics can be a
domain in which ones relationships and human entan-
glements are publicly dissected, and ones approach to
having genetic knowledge cannot be accepted as a free
choice but requires explanation. The experience of test
decliners in Australia suggests that avoiding medical
insurance penalties was an easier and socially legitimate
explanation that could be safely voiced without fear of
negative judgment. Whether test decliners in the LS fam-
ily were marginalized and felt unable to express what
looks like a minority view is not known. Their voices are
missing from this article and elsewhere, and this raises
concerns for ethical practice in the age of genomics
where the boundaries of what is sought and what can be
known are blurred. The boundaries are more indistinct
for those who choose not to know, and without engage-
ment with genetics professionals, non-negotiable.
The data showed that genetic testing was viewed as
both a choice and a responsibility. Yet the apparent con-
flict between rights to autonomy and the moral impera-
tives of responsibility allowed scope to prefer or defend
choice over responsibility or responsibility over choice.
The right not to know seemed an important moral
construct for managing unpopular decisions of test
decliners who were also close family members. Eroding
the right not to know in the genomic age might therefore
have subtle yet profound consequences for family
relationships.
Clearly, my participants common experiences of
genetic investigation over three decades are likely to be
different to those who seek genetic knowledge in the
early 21st century. However, whilst their processes of
knowing may be unique, the strength of the data lies in
their stories of troubled or changed family relationships
which continue to have resonance for others seeking
genetic diagnoses for familial cancer susceptibility. What
is important information for families faced with genetic
testing goes beyond the timing or process of the test;
also important are insights into the long-term conse-
quences for family relationships.
These insights contribute to important narratives
about cultural engagement with genetics and have impli-
cations for practice in the genomic era. The data raise
questions about the marginalization of test decliners
within families, leading to further questions concerning
the adequacy and meaning of the term free from
coercion within the code of ethics for genetic counsel-
ling. Since any deployment of genetic knowledge is a
moral process, I conclude that honest communication
about the limitations of what is offered in genetic and
genomic testing is vital. Honest communication about
limitations would go some way to address misunder-
standings and thereby influence what can be morally
claimed in seeking and having genetic information. For
example, the limitations to predicting, preventing or
ameliorating disease may influence whether having a
genetic test is framed as a no brainer. In this way, those
who decline will have more support and space in which
to consider their decision and will not risk being
judged negatively by family members who want and need
to know. In making space for the moral agenda in the
clinic, those who would rather decline a genetic test can
openly express their morally acceptable alternatives.
Whilst there can be varied reasons why the right not to
know is a marginalized position, holding that position
has an impact on family relationships. In communication
about genetic testing what is needed is an approach
that is sensitive to the ways in which decisions to test or
not to test are both socially located and socially
consequential.
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